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Abstract
The increasing ubiquity of low-cost wireless sensors in smart
homes and buildings has enabled users to easily deploy sys-
tems to remotely monitor and control their environments.
However, this raises privacy concerns for third-party occu-
pants, such as a hotel room guest who may be unaware of
deployed clandestine sensors. Previous methods focused on
specific modalities such as detecting cameras, but do not pro-
vide a generalizable and comprehensive method to capture
arbitrary sensors which may be “spying" on a user. In this
work, we seek to determine whether one can walk in a room
and detect any wireless sensor monitoring an individual. As
such, we propose SNOOPDOG , a framework to not only de-
tect wireless sensors that are actively monitoring a user, but
also classify and localize each device. SNOOPDOG works by
establishing causality between patterns in observable wire-
less traffic and a trusted sensor in the same space, e.g., an
inertial measurement unit (IMU) that captures a user’s move-
ment. Once causality is established, SNOOPDOG performs
packet inspection to inform the user about the monitoring
device. Finally, SNOOPDOG localizes the clandestine device
in a 2D plane using a novel trial-based localization technique.
We evaluated SNOOPDOG across several devices and various
modalities, and were able to detect causality 96.6% percent
of the time, classify suspicious devices with 100% accuracy,
and localize devices to a sufficiently reduced sub-space.
1 Introduction
The explosion of internet-of-things devices in smart homes,
buildings, and cities [1] can be partly attributed to the prolif-
eration of low-cost wireless sensors in tandem with advance-
ments in embedded device battery technology [2]. Affordable
sensors, including cameras and motion sensors, have facili-
tated deployments to monitor and control these environments.
Although there are profound positive impacts that ubiquitous
sensor-rich environments can have on society, there is an
inherent risk in enabling users access to such pervasive sens-
ing – particularly when these environments host occupants
oblivious to the presence of these sensors.
A person’s physical privacy in these contexts is entirely at
the discretion of the owner who deploys these sensors. Reg-
ulation is unclear in more informal settings, such as a guest
residing in a home or a homestay lodging. Although these
environments may be enhanced with a legitimate set of sen-
sors and actuators to provide security, surveillance, comfort,
and convenience, there have been several instances where a
hosting owner has attempted to spy on the occupants in home-
stay settings [3], motel lodgings [4], and rooms aboard cruise
ships [5]. There are even instances in well-established hotel
chains and mall restrooms when a malicious employee or
customer has bugged several rooms [6]. In [7], Southworth et
al. report that such sensors are also used for ‘intimate partner
stalking’, which may enable domestic abusers.
The prevalent method to detect bugs involves an RF re-
ceiver that senses if the received power in a particular fre-
quency range is above a certain threshold. However, since
bug detectors work on the principle of sensing surrounding
RF signals, they can easily be falsely triggered by legitimate
RF devices such as mobile phones, radios, and other devices
such as smart TV and smart doorbell in the vicinity. This lack
of reliability limits the practicality of these detectors. Further-
more, they provide no semantic information regarding device
information, location, or whether the device is actually moni-
toring a user. An alternate method has emerged to detect the
presence of IoT devices based on network traffic statistics [8];
however, such an approach still fails to capture information
about device location or active monitoring region.
More sophisticated solutions have recently been proposed
to specifically detect wireless cameras. The general approach
is to correlate known semantic information about the environ-
ment with network traffic patterns. For instance, Wampler et
al. [9] showed that changing lighting conditions causes no-
table variations to appear in a wireless camera’s video traffic;
that is, video encoding leaks sensitive environmental infor-
mation. This discourse was leveraged to detect a camera by
flickering a light source for a short period of time and corre-
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lating it to changes in network traffic [10, 11]. Similarly, an
approach has been presented that correlates the Wi-Fi traffic
patterns of a trusted camera with Wi-Fi traffic patterns of other
hidden cameras on a network to detect whether they are simul-
taneously observing the same space [12]. But each of these
camera-specific approaches, which correlate simultaneous ob-
servations between trusted cameras and hidden cameras, fail
to generalize across modalities. For example, varying light-
ing conditions would be ineffective for detecting a hidden
microphone or an RF sensor. More interestingly, there has
been a preliminary effort that used human motion as to detect
and coarsely localize hidden cameras [13]. Human motion is
an example of an event that can be generalized across many
modalities if the event is formalized correctly. Furthermore,
human activity serves as the ideal reference event for deter-
mining whether a clandestine sensor is monitoring a human.
In this paper, we propose SNOOPDOG, a generalized frame-
work to detect clandestine wireless sensors that are monitoring
a user in a private space. SNOOPDOG leverages the notion
of causality to determine if the values of a trusted sensor
cause patterns in Wi-Fi traffic stemming from other devices.
In particular, SNOOPDOG works by having the user perturb
the trusted sensor values to observe if there is a causal pat-
tern in the Wi-Fi traffic for a different device. For instance,
if a wireless camera is monitoring a user who is wearing an
inertial measurement unit (IMU), the IMU values indicate a
causal relationship with the camera’s Wi-Fi traffic. SNOOP-
DOG utilizes encoding scheme models of different wireless
sensing modalities to classify the sensor type, and then cross-
references packet inspection with publicly available informa-
tion of manufacturers to identify the specific device model.
We further introduce a novel approach that leverages sensor
coverage techniques to provide fine-grained localization of
a detected sensor. We implemented SNOOPDOG utilizing a
trusted set of sensors on a user’s mobile phone as well as
a packet sniffer to observe Wi-Fi traffic patterns. In the fu-
ture, we envision SNOOPDOG to be implemented as an app
on either a smartwatch or a smartphone, both of which have
sufficient sensing capabilities (with improvements in their
Wi-Fi cards that would allow them to hop channels in monitor
mode) to make it easily accessible to non-technical users.
SNOOPDOG operates in three phases. Assuming the trusted
set of sensors is on the user (e.g., a wearable device or smart-
phone), SNOOPDOG is first in a passive monitoring phase,
searching for suspicious causal patterns between the wireless
traffic and the user’s normal activity. If a device is flagged as
potentially monitoring the user, an active phase is engaged,
and the user is instructed to perform a series of specific actions
to detect the sensor with high fidelity. Finally, if the sensor is
unable to be spotted through a preliminary search, a localiza-
tion phase engages for accurate ascertainment of clandestine
placement. The user can either skip the background or the
active phase per their convenience.
We evaluate SNOOPDOG over a representative set of wire-
less sensors following a taxonomy of popular sensing devices
that may be used for surveillance. The framework had a de-
tection rate of 96.6% and a device classification rate of 100%
when the injected multi-modal event was human motion. We
show that the location of the bug can be narrowed down to
a sufficiently reduced region that facilitates the user’s search
for the device. This feature is a vast improvement over state-
of-the-art approaches that localize devices as either indoors
or outdoors. While SNOOPDOG cannot detect any wireless
sensor monitoring the user (Section 8), it can detect a broad
set of commonly used wireless sensors. We further formalize
the challenges and limitations across different modalities.
Contributions: Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose SNOOPDOG , a generalized framework to
detect arbitrary hidden clandestine sensors by leveraging
the cause-effect relationship between a trusted set of
sensor values observing an injected event and Wi-Fi
traffic patterns.
• We present a novel technique that leverages the notion
of directional sensor coverage to provide state-of-the-art
localization for clandestine devices.
• We show how SNOOPDOG can be extended to identify
the model of a device based on packet inspection and
publicly available information of device manufacturers.
• We evaluate SNOOPDOG with a mobile phone and a
Wi-Fi packet sniffer on a representative set of clandes-
tine sensors and show a detection rate of 96.6% and
a device classification rate of 100% when the injected
multi-modal event is human motion.
2 Background and System Model
The general approach to detecting wireless sensors relies on
the notion that the device’s wireless communication leaks
information in some domain. This aspect has been exploited
for the development of wireless bug1 detectors which can
sense the presence of wireless transmitters in a space [14,
15]. Bug detectors are RF receivers that look for signals in
a frequency range with a received power above a certain
threshold. The received power threshold and frequency range
can be set according to a target set of wireless devices. For
instance, to detect sensors that communicate over Wi-Fi, a
device would scan frequency ranges around 2.4 GHz or 5
GHz. Similarly, the range can be set accordingly for other
wireless technologies like Bluetooth [16] and Z-wave [17]. In
tuning the received power threshold, there is a direct trade-off
between detection accuracy and false positives [14]. If the
threshold is too low, one may falsely attribute wireless signals
from other devices in the space, like mobile phones, to bugs.
On the other hand, a high threshold risks ignoring wireless
1A bug in this context refers to a hidden device spying on the user.
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bugs that are not within close proximity of the detector. As
these detectors provide no semantic information about the
detected signals, it is difficult to assume whether or not the
observed signal is truly originating from a hidden bug [15].
As wireless sensors transmit their information via packets,
another technique to detect them uses packet sniffing. Ap-
proaches like DewiCam [13] sniff wireless packets and use
their characteristics to train a classifier to identify whether or
not a particular device is a camera. However, even if the type
of device is determined, it may or may not be monitoring the
user. If there is a camera monitoring the door of a house, it
does not pose the same threat to a user’s privacy as a camera
that is monitoring the bedroom. Hence, even if we are able to
detect what type of device is present in the space, it is difficult
to characterize if its intention is adversarial. A direct way to
identify whether a device poses a potential privacy threat is
to determine whether or not it is actively monitoring the user.
Detecting sensors monitoring a physical space. If a wire-
less sensor is monitoring someone in a physical space, the data
that it captures is a function of the person’s interaction with
the space. For example, if someone moves into a space moni-
tored by a motion detector, the sensor’s control mechanism
may be triggered and begin uploading relevant information
to the cloud to be processed and forwarded (e.g., an alert to
the device owner or downstream actuation). Similarly, the in-
formation recorded by a video camera captures variation as a
result of motion within the scene that it is capturing. If another
sensor can observe and measure the interaction of the user
with their surroundings, we can identify whether the user’s
actions indicate a causal relationship with the wireless traffic
of the sensor. If such a relationship is found, then the sensor
must be monitoring the user. To generalize our approach, we
provide a system and an adversary model.
2.1 System Model
We consider a system model for SNOOPDOG where a user
has access to a laptop or smartphone device with a network
card that can enter monitor mode to sniff wireless packets
over the same channel as one or more clandestine sensors.
The system should further be equipped with a trusted set of
ground truth sensors to establish causality between the sensor
values and the associated Wi-Fi patterns from the clandestine
wireless sensor(s)2. These capabilities require a set of certain
assumptions.
Wi-Fi sniffing assumptions. We assume that the Wi-Fi snif-
fer on the user’s device can monitor the encrypted traffic
streaming from the clandestine device. SNOOPDOG does not
require any form of granted access to a particular network,
i.e., SNOOPDOG should be able to sniff the device regardless
of whether or not the network is closed or hidden. Unlike
2We assume there may be additional, non-clandestine sensors that are
monitoring the user. Such superfluous information is still informative, as the
goal of this work is to detect all wireless sensors monitoring a user.
previous solutions, this implies that the user does not need to
know the SSID or password of the network.
Causality assumptions. We assume that the user has a suf-
ficient set of trusted ground truth sensors whose modalities
are sensing any of the user’s activities that would exhibit a
causality with the Wi-Fi encoding patterns of any clandes-
tine wireless sensors. We formalize the notion of sufficient
causality in Section 4.
2.2 Adversary Model
The adversary’s goal is to remotely spy on a third-party occu-
pant of a private space in real-time. We assume the adversary
uses an arbitrary set of wireless, commercial-off-the-shelf
(COTS) sensors that are tailored for clandestine placement.
The communication between the attacker and sensor may
be encrypted and placed on an arbitrary wireless frequency
band. We further assume the adversary has deployed these
clandestine sensors in a manner that is not apparently vis-
ible to the user within the space. We focus on an attacker
utilizing devices that communicate over Wi-Fi, as this is the
most prevalent method of wireless communication for remote
monitoring using commercial and consumer equipment3.
3 SNOOPDOG Overview
The goal of SNOOPDOG is to identify and localize clandes-
tine wireless sensors within an arbitrary space. As depicted
in Figure 1, SNOOPDOG can detect and localize a wireless
sensor given it has access to a trusted sensor that can mea-
sure and quantify the ground truth in the modality that we are
trying to detect. SNOOPDOG works in three phases. When a
user first enters a new space, SNOOPDOG operates in a back-
ground mode to determine whether a user is being monitored
based on the cause-effect relationship between the values
of a trusted sensor (e.g., an on-body IMU) and Wi-Fi traffic
patterns. If the user wants to clear a room immediately, the
background phase may be optionally skipped; alternatively,
the background phase offers a low-overhead solution to bug
detection. If a clandestine sensor is discovered, SNOOPDOG
enters its second phase and asks the user to perform a unique
perturbation in the space to further ascertain the presence of
a snooping sensor. The associated packets are then inspected
to identify the possible device type based on the physical
(MAC) address. Finally, in the third phase, SNOOPDOG uti-
lizes a trial-based localization technique to identify the spe-
cific placement of the monitoring device. With the appropriate
selection of ground truth sensor, that is, a device which can
semantically capture at least a subset of the events captured
by the snooping device, SNOOPDOG can detect clandestine
wireless sensors of arbitrary modality.
3Although SNOOPDOG focuses on Wi-Fi-connected devices, we discuss
in Section 8 how such a system could be generalized to other wireless com-
munication standards and protocols.
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Figure 1: Overview of SnoopDog framework. The SNOOPDOG framework first identifies if a user is being monitored based on
the cause-effect relationship between the values of a trusted sensor, e.g., an IMU, and Wi-Fi traffic patterns. It then inspects the
associated packets and identifies the possible devices based on the physical (MAC) address. Finally, SNOOPDOG localizes each
device relative to the user based on the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) values.
The objectives for a solution which can detect hidden de-
vices in space should have the following characteristics:
• The solution must work for arbitrary sensing modality.
• The user must be able to generate events in the space
that will establish causality between a sufficient set of
ground truth sensors and any clandestine sensors.
• The solution must work equally well in indoor and out-
door conditions.
• The solution must be reasonably compact enough for a
user to easily transport from room to room.
• The solution must work for all Wi-Fi configurations.
• The solution should not be affected by encryption.
Given these challenges, we present our design for clandes-
tine wireless sensor detection, identification, and localization.
4 Detecting and Identifying Snooping Wire-
less Sensors
This section outlines the ability of SNOOPDOG to detect
whether a clandestine sensor is actively snooping on a user.
We describe the search space for wireless sensors, how to
establish causality, how to generalize across modalities, and
how to understand various sensors’ wireless transmission.
4.1 Searching for Wireless Sensors
The adversary can create a Wi-Fi network and connect the
snooping device to it. As a result, the hidden device can be
present in any of the possible Wi-Fi channels. Even though
SNOOPDOG does not need access to these networks, it still
needs to scan all Wi-Fi frequencies and look for any de-
vices transmitting on them. 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz are the
most popular bands for Wi-Fi networks, and as such, we fo-
cus on those particular bands, even though the SNOOPDOG
scan region can be easily extended to include other ranges.
During discovery, the Wi-Fi Network Interface Card (NIC)
scans through all channels sequentially to find available ac-
cess points (APs) [18, 19]. Similarly, SNOOPDOG also scans
through all the Wi-Fi channels in monitor mode, but instead of
looking for available APs, it looks for transmissions in those
channels and creates a list of devices using the MAC address
present in packet headers. As a result, SNOOPDOG does not
need to be connected to any specific AP to operate. Even if a
network is hidden, its transmissions can still be observed by
monitoring the Wi-Fi channel. Thus SNOOPDOG can detect
devices on any Wi-Fi network. Because devices may transmit
data intermittently, SNOOPDOG continuously scans all Wi-Fi
channels and actively maintains an aggregate set of traffic
data. Once the list of devices has been populated, SNOOP-
DOG then seeks to detect causality between user activity and
data being transmitted from each device.
4.2 Detecting Causality with User Activity
Detecting the cause-effect relationship between the action
of a user in a space and the data captured by a clandestine,
wireless sensor requires access to two essential components:
1) a ground truth sensor to capture information about the user
in the space and 2) a representation of the data collected
by the clandestine sensor. While data packets transmitted
by wireless sensors may be encrypted, the header informa-
tion is not. This header information provides us with the
MAC address and payload size of each transmitted packet.
This data can be grouped and aggregated for all the packets
within a time window and provide information as to how
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much data was transmitted by each device within that period.
Given a ground truth sensor, one can then identify causality
between the ground truth sensor values and the patterns in the
volume of data transmitted by each device in the space. In
contrast to machine learning techniques, a causality approach
allows SNOOPDOG to find the cause-effect relationship of ar-
bitrary modality across any device that is transmitting causal
data. One such method to find this cause-effect relationship is
Granger Causality.
Granger Causality. A popular method to study causal rela-
tionships between two series is Granger Causality [20]. Ac-
cording to Granger Causality, if a series X Granger-causes
series Y , then past values of X should contain information that
helps predict Y above and beyond the information contained
in past values of Y alone. Formally, if we have a series Y as:
yt = a0+a1 ∗ yt−1+a2 ∗ yt−2+ ....+an ∗ yt−n, (1)
and we augment this series with the series X as follows:
yt = a0+a1∗yt−1+....+an∗yt−n+b1∗xt−1+....+bm∗xt−m,
(2)
then X Granger-causes Y if and only if Equation 2 gives a
better prediction of yt than Equation 1. Here, yt−k are called
lags of y and xt−k are called lags of x where k ∈ [1,n].
4.3 Characterizing a Representative Set of
Snooping Sensors
In order to choose a set of ground truth sensors that can cap-
ture causality across any modality, we focus on generalizing
across a representative set, including cameras, RF, and arbi-
trary sensors that report inferred (as opposed to raw) events.
Visual sensors. Wireless cameras are typically encoded with
a codec that recognizes underlying patterns in the frames
of the video and utilizes this information for compression.
One such codec is H.264 [21]. An encoder first encodes the
video using the standard, and a decoder then reconstructs the
original video with minor information loss.
Standard temporal compression algorithms compress the
video with 3 key frame-types, denoted I, P, and B frames–as
shown in Figure 2. I frames (Intra-coded picture) hold com-
plete image information, whereas P and B frames contain frac-
tional image information, i.e., scene differences. As I frames
are a complete image, they do not require any other frames to
be decoded. P frames (Predicted picture) only contain changes
in the image from previous frames. The information in a P
frame is combined with the information of the I frame pre-
ceding it to obtain the resulting image. B (Bi-directionally
predicted pictures) frames can construct the image from either
direction. They can be coded with changes from the I or P
frames before them, changes from I and P frames after them,
or interpolation between the I/P frames before and after them.
B frames are most compressible, followed by P frames, and
finally, I frames.
Figure 2: I-P-B Frames [22]
Hence, with increasing motion in the scene recorded by
an IP camera, there will be an increase in the data that must
be transmitted due to the increase in the number of P and B
frames sent. Camera traffic will increase as the number of
pixels being perturbed in the scene increases; similarly, traffic
will decrease if the scene transitions to a stationary one. As
such, if a human subject were to perform some motion in
the scene, stop for enough time to let the camera video settle
down, and then move again, it will result in a unique camera
traffic pattern that corresponds to the user’s motion. This
cause-effect relationship between human motion and camera
traffic can then be used to discover if a wireless IP camera
is present in an occupied space. If there is no relationship
between the camera traffic and user motion, then the camera
is not monitoring the user.
RF sensors. Low cost, off-the-shelf millimeter-wave
(mmWave) RF sensors are available that record the scene in
the form of point-clouds. Recent works [23, 24] have shown
that these point clouds can be used to infer human activity.
However, unlike a camera, a radar device is a point scatterer,
thus at any given time, only certain points in the scene reflect
back. Hence, with motion in the scene, the number of points
captured in every frame by the sensor (radar) vary consider-
ably. In an empty scene, the number of points captured by
these sensors is fairly constant but varies as subjects move
about the space. The sensor also collects the velocity and
intensity of the power received. This data helps the sensor
in inferring fine-grained information about the space. If such
a sensor live-streams point-cloud data over Wi-Fi, the pay-
load size will vary over time with changes in the number of
points captured in the scene by the sensor. Hence, the network
traffic will fluctuate with the number of points that are being
captured in the frame. As such, there exists a cause-effect
relationship between the subject’s motion and the device’s
traffic.
Acoustic sensors. Another common type of bug used to
snoop on people is microphones. With the growth in personal
home assistant devices such as the Google Home or Amazon
Alexa [25], it is trivial for someone to buy and install such
listening devices in their homes. Although they are typically
triggered by a keyphrase such as “Okay Google" or “Alexa",
there are “Drop In" features that facilitate remote snooping.
An adversary can also change the wake word of these devices
to enable recording conversations of interest. Due to their
compact form factor, they can be easily hidden. In such cases,
this device will also work like an event-based clandestine
sensor. Hence, services like SNOOPDOG that monitor traf-
fic for change in network patterns and either correlate them
with another sensor recording of the same modality or find
5
a cause-effect relationship with the ground-truth can detect
their presence using network sniffing [26, 27]. Here, instead
of the IMU, we use the microphone on the user’s smartphone
as the trusted ground-truth sensor. In section 8-Q6, we discuss
why it is challenging to detect and localize acoustic sensors
that are continuously streaming.
Wireless sensors that encode inferred events. Motion sen-
sors do not transmit a continuous stream of information. Most
off-the-shelf motion sensors are passive infrared (PIR) based.
They measure the infrared (IR) light from objects in their
field of view. Any change in this incoming IR light is in-
ferred as motion. Instead of continuously transmitting, they
occasionally send data to their cloud service for processing
once triggered by motion. Additionally, a camera can be pro-
grammed to continuously record video but only upload when
a certain event occurs in the scene. These cameras behave like
motion sensors and hence can be treated similarly. Virtual
assistants also wait for trigger words to transmit a request to
the associated cloud service, e.g., a user stating the device
name to activate it [25].
Figure 7 shows the wireless traffic captured from an ordi-
nary off-the-shelf motion sensor. Motion events in the scene
trigger network activity. These events are a result of a subject
moving in front of the device. Thus if a user moves around the
room, stops, and moves again, there will be a unique cause-
effect relationship between user motion and device traffic.
4.4 Device Identification via MAC Address
A MAC address is a universally unique ID assigned to the
Network Interface Controller (NIC) for every networked de-
vice. It consists of 48 bits which are typically represented as
12 hexadecimal characters, i.e., xx:xx:xx:xx:xx:xx. The
first 24 bits are the OUI (Organizationally Unique Identifier),
which can uniquely identify a manufacturer or a vendor.
The MAC address of the sender and the receiver are con-
tained within each exchanged Wi-Fi packet. More importantly,
this information is not encrypted. As a result, SNOOPDOG
can easily obtain the MAC address to look up the device
vendor. While we acknowledge that the MAC address can be
spoofed, this technique can still prove useful in the many cases
where the adversary is a non-expert and thus has not spoofed
the MAC. SNOOPDOG contains a database with names and
MAC addresses of known vendors that manufacture surveil-
lance devices. As SNOOPDOG detects more sensors, we add
them to the available database4. Traffic fingerprinting tech-
niques [28–34] can also be used to overcome the shortcom-
ings of MAC-based identification.
5 Snooping Sensor Localization
Algorithm 1 details the trial-based localization used by
SNOOPDOG to infer sensor location. In the case of multiple
4The link has been hidden in order to make the paper anonymous.
Algorithm 1: LOCALIZE identifies the location of a par-
ticular snooping sensor in a defined region-of-interest
Input: The sensor’s MAC address
The region of interest
Output: The sensor’s location within the region
1 BBox← /0
2 traversing← BeginTraversingRegion(region)
3 while traversing do
4 userloc← DeadReckoningLocation()
5 inView←GrangerCausality(MAC)
6 if inView then
7 BBox← BBox∪{userloc}
8 traversing← SparseBBox(BBox)
9 Loop
10 MLE←MostLikelySensorLocation(region,BBox)
11 if SufficientBBox(region, BBox) then
12 return (BBox,MLE)
13 trialRegion = GenerateTrial(MLE,BBox)
14 inView = PerformTrial(trialRegion)
15 if inView then
16 BBox← trialRegion
17 else
18 BBox← BBox\ trialRegion
active sensors, this process can be repeated for each device.
Setup. Localization requires two input parameters: a region-
of-interest to search over, and the snooping sensor’s MAC
address. To define the region-of-interest, we leverage Dead
Reckoning [35, 36] for indoor user localization. For instance,
a dead reckoning mobile application on a user’s phone can
instruct the user to walk the perimeter and capture the region
boundary. Aside from identifying granger causality in traffic
patterns, the MAC address is also used to ensure an appropri-
ate trial method for localization (e.g., via techniques discussed
in Section 4.4 and [8]).
5.1 Identifying Sensor Coverage
Although the malicious sensor is known to monitor some-
where within the region-of-interest, it is unlikely to cover the
entire region. Lines (1)-(8) narrow down the full search space
into a bounding box BBox of the sensor’s field-of-view. To
begin, a user is instructed to traverse the region (line 2). At
regular time intervals, the user’s location is captured, and the
snooping sensor’s traffic is monitored for causality. Using
the Granger Causality technique described in Section 4, a
particular location is identified as either within or outside
sensor coverage. This process continues until the bounding
box is determined to have sufficient density for performing
trial-based localization, depending on the coverage area size.
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The remainder of Algorithm 1 (lines 9-18) reduces the
BBox scope of sensor coverage via directional elimination.
Repeated trials are performed to specifically target high-
probability origins in order to either identify or eliminate
likely sensor locations. Each round begins by solving for the
most likely origin MLE for the sensor (line 10). While this
process could be performed randomly, utilizing physical in-
formation about the current bounding box can significantly
reduce the number of necessary trial rounds. For example, if
the bounding box shape can be reasonably fitted to a trian-
gle, then the sensor is likely horizontal-facing and placed on
a wall. On the other hand, an ellipsoid coverage area likely
indicates a sensor placed on the ceiling or floor.
An iterative process then proceeds to reduce the area of
possible sensor locations to a pre-defined threshold (e.g., 10%
of the region), upon which the bounding box and MLE are
returned (line 11). In each iteration, a directional trial is con-
ducted. GenerateTrial identifies a suitable position and head-
ing for the trial by selecting a point near the center of the
bounding box and facing the MPE (line 12). In our evalu-
ation, we found distances of approximately 3 meters to be
the maximum applicable distance for a trial. The trial takes
one of many forms; for an inertial sensor, a user faces the
designated direction and waves an object (e.g., hand or shoe)
closely in front of their chest while shielding this activity with
their body from any sensor present behind them. To trigger
a camera sensor, a laptop plays a video clip that randomly
flashes the screen with different colors. For audio, a trigger
sound is played, and so on. If the trial results increased the
device traffic, the bounding box is reduced to areas within
visible range (line 16); otherwise, those areas are removed
(line 18), and the next iteration begins.
5.2 Ensuring Sufficiently Reduced Region
In order to provide a guarantee that this localization method
will always result in a minimal bounding box that is suffi-
ciently small (e.g., 10% of the search region), a key assump-
tion must be made: for any arbitrary bounding box, a trial
can be identified which will eliminate a proper subset of the
bounding box. In the case of Algorithm 1, this assumption
can be reformed such that one can always construct a trial
that eliminates at least a single point contained within the
bounding box set. Due to the directional nature of each trial,
this can be achieved simply by conducting a trial that is posi-
tioned directly between two points within the bounding box,
and facing directly towards one of the two points such that
the other is obstructed. In the case of two points with large
intermediate distances, a two-phase trial must be performed
facing towards (and away from) each point, respectively.
Given the assumption that every trial can eliminate at least
a single point from the bounding box set, guaranteeing that
Algorithm 1 will always reduce the region to a certain size is
trivial. In the worst case, for a bounding box of n points, n-1
trials must be performed. In practice, each trial can eliminate
many points contained within the bounding box. Furthermore,
by leveraging the most likely sensor location, one can reduce
the search space significantly and with relatively few trials.
6 Implementation
This section presents an overview of our SNOOPDOG frame-
work implementation by instrumenting readily available tools
that are likely to be in a user’s possession. We rely upon the
following commonplace hardware and software.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Wi-Fi Packet Sniffing: A laptop (Lenovo Thinkpad) is used
to run the Wireshark network sniffing utility. The laptop’s
network card enters monitor mode and begins capturing all
transmitted packets in the Wi-Fi frequency band to aggregate
traffic statistics for analysis. As it is not necessary to connect
to a specific wireless network to monitor traffic, SNOOPDOG
can capture and identify clandestine wireless sensors across
all Wi-Fi traffic, even if they reside on a closed or hidden
network. A smartphone can also be used instead of a laptop,
but requires a rooted [37] phone.
Collecting User’s Motion Data: User’s motion data is col-
lected via the IMU present on the smartphone (Google Pixel
3). The smartphone is placed either in the user’s hand or inside
the user’s pocket. 50 Hz accelerometer data is collected and
used to study the cause-effect relationship between motion
and sensor traffic. We collect along each of the 3 axes and use
them separately as if motion is present in only one direction,
the other 2 axes contribute minimally to the analysis, and may
instead serve as noise. The smartphone is also used to collect
audio and localize the user in his/her surroundings, which
aids in localization.
6.2 Overview
SNOOPDOG sniffs the wireless traffic and aggregates the
statistics over time, while user motion is captured using the
IMU. This data is used to detect hidden sensors monitoring
the user by measuring the cause-effect relationship between
user motion and device traffic. SNOOPDOG also captures
device MAC addresses to infer the manufacturer via an avail-
able database we have created. After detection, the trial-based
algorithm is used to localize these sensors.
6.3 Aggregation of Traffic Statistics
Each device’s traffic is grouped by MAC address, windowed,
and processed to compute device traffic volume and variation.
SNOOPDOG monitors packet sequence number in the WLAN
layer to isolate and remove duplicate or redundant packets.
As large images are sent over multiple fixed-length packets,
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a sufficiently large window size must be used. We chose a
100 ms window to group all packets with the same image
within one interval. Cameras require a frame rate higher than
10 Hz to satisfy the flicker fusion (i.e., persistence of vision)
threshold of the human eye [11, 38].
For camera encodings, we discard I-frames, as they do not
encode differences in a scene and require higher bandwidth,
thereby adversely affecting the causality analysis. To discover
these frames, we first identify the camera frame rate by con-
verting the time domain traffic to the frequency domain using
a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The frame rate is the peak of
the FFT, as shown in Figure 3. We then change the aggrega-
tion window size to correspond to this frame rate, calculate
the data rate of the camera, as shown in Figure 5, and smooth
variations with sliding window aggregates.
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Figure 3: Detecting frame rate of the camera. In this case, the
frame rate of the camera is 25 Hz which is where the peak is.
6.4 Detecting the Cause-Effect Relationship
between User Motion and Hidden Devices
While sniffing the network, SNOOPDOG classifies the net-
worked devices present into two categories: devices that trans-
mit data continuously, and devices that have periodic or event-
based transmission.
6.4.1 Wireless Sensors that Encode Raw Data
Some representative sensors that continuously transmit vari-
ably encoded raw data include camera and RF sensors.
Camera: When a camera is monitoring a static scene, the traf-
fic is fairly constant, as shown in Figure 4. As the scene is per-
turbed by human motion, the wireless traffic changes rapidly.
However, it is yet unclear whether human motion causes this
variation. As soon as the user enters a new space, he or she
can turn on SNOOPDOG, which works in the background
to correlate IMU data with Wi-Fi traffic of the transmitting
devices. As users walk in a space, the starting and stopping
patterns of their motion are unique. This unique pattern cre-
ates a fingerprint for the camera traffic. Once SNOOPDOG is
able to determine a cause-effect relationship between device
traffic and user’s motion, it alerts the user. To definitively
ascertain the presence of a camera, SNOOPDOG enters phase
two, where the user is asked to perform a stop-start-stop-start-
stop (S5) motion as follows: 1) the user stays stationary for
some time to allow the device traffic to stabilize. 2) The user
performs jumping jacks at the current position. 3) The user
stops again and waits for the camera traffic to settle. 4) The
user performs jumping jacks again. 5) The user stops. This
motions causes a pattern to appear in the Wi-Fi traffic as
shown in figure 5.
The entire detection phase requires 35−45 seconds. While
the user is performing the above S5 motion, SNOOPDOG
sniffs the Wi-Fi packets on the network and records the user’s
IMU acceleration. Figure 5 plots the camera traffic after I-
frame suppression and user accelerometer data while perform-
ing the S5 motion. We observe that camera traffic is a func-
tion of human motion. When the human is static, the traffic is
small, but when the human begins performing jumping jacks,
the traffic rate increases. To prove that the accelerometer se-
ries indeed has an effect on the camera traffic, we leverage
Granger Causality using the statsmodel package in Python.
The null hypothesis of the Granger Causality Test is that the
IMU series does not granger-causes the camera traffic series.
Hence, if the p-value of our test is below a certain threshold
of 0.08, we can reject the null hypothesis and claim that the
IMU series granger-causes the camera traffic series.
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Figure 4: Wi-Fi traffic captured from a camera over a static
scene and a scene where a human is walking around.
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Figure 5: Wi-Fi traffic of a camera and its comparison with
IMU data of the user who was being monitored in the scene.
RF sensor: the detection process remains the same for RF
as that of a camera. We use an off-the-shelf mmWave RF
sensor from Texas Instruments, as shown in [23]. We model
the information obtained from the sensor as Wi-Fi traffic.
The modeled Wi-Fi traffic from the RF sensor due to human
motion is shown in Figure 6. Unlike a camera, RF sensors
respond to either motion or other sources of RF in the space.
As soon as motion occurs within the space, the traffic
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changes rapidly in response. This is because the points cap-
tured by the RF sensor vary with motion. If the traffic of
some device which was static when there was no motion but
changes rapidly when there is motion and goes back to be-
ing static when motion stops, it is a clear indicator that the
device is monitoring user movement. To detect such devices,
SNOOPDOG first monitors the traffic when the scene is static.
It then asks the user to perform the S5 motion in the space
while SNOOPDOG monitors the traffic. As soon as the user is
finished, the user should leave the space so that SNOOPDOG
can monitor the traffic again and conclude the presence or
absence of an RF sensor.
Figure 6: Modeled Wi-Fi traffic for an RF sensor in a static
scene and one where a user performs our detection trial.
6.4.2 Wireless Sensors that Encode Inferred Events
Sensors that encode inferred events may transmit informa-
tion periodically or upon event detection. By simply exam-
ining network traffic, it is difficult to ascertain if the device
is transmitting periodic data, like a temperature sensor, or
transmitting inferred events like a motion sensor.
Motion Sensor: Typical off-the-shelf motion sensors have a
timeout to prevent continuous alerts. After the sensor detects
a motion event, it stops inferring motion events for some time.
If a human walks into the room, the motion sensor sends that
information to a cloud server, which in turn sends an alert to
the snooping user’s smartphone or performs an action like
turning on lights. After sending an alert, the sensor waits
for the timeout period before it looks for more events. Most
motion sensors have a timeout period between 30 seconds
and 3 minutes. Similarly, there can be other sensors in the
scene that have a timeout period between uploading events.
To discover a device’s timeout period, SNOOPDOG correlates
user movements with device traffic. If SNOOPDOG detects
two events in the traffic series of a device and the user was
in motion during the time between the two events, this time
is noted as the timeout period. SNOOPDOG uses its active
phase to further improve the timeout estimation by asking
the user to move around the space until two events are de-
tected in the device’s network traffic. If the user wants even
higher confidence in the detection, SNOOPDOG asks the user
to move around the space, leave the space for the timeout
period, and then move around the space again. After that, the
user moves out from the space and then waits for the timeout
period to end. If SNOOPDOG detects traffic by the device
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Time in seconds
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
W
ifi
 D
at
a 
in
 b
yt
es
(a)
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Time in seconds
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
W
ifi
 d
at
a 
in
 b
yt
es
(b)
Figure 7: (a) Wi-Fi traffic of a motion sensor. The red-dotted
line signifies a motion event. (b) Wi-Fi traffic of an Alexa
device for the user repeating the same phrase 4 times.
around the same time the user moved and none when the user
is not moving, we can conclude that the traffic of the device
is caused by user movement. This process can be repeated
to increase the confidence of detection. A room can also be
equipped with a camera that transmits motion events in the
form of alerts. Such a camera can similarly be detected. In
Figure 7, we move around the room (denoted by red dotted
lines) and notice that the Wi-Fi traffic from the motion sensor
responds to these motion events.
Audio snooping: SNOOPDOG records user conversations in
the background and correlates it with the traffic of the devices
on the network. If the occurrence of a certain phrase or a
word cause the traffic of a device to change, SNOOPDOG asks
the user to repeat those phrases until it can establish a cause-
effect relationship between the occurrence of that phrase and
the traffic of the device. Once SNOOPDOG knows the “wake
word" for the acoustic home-assistant device, it repeats the
recording several times while monitoring the device traffic to
increase the confidence level of detection.
In our implementation, we used an Amazon Echo whose
wake word was “Alexa". In Figure 7, we say the phrase “Alexa,
what’s the time right now?" four times and plot the device traf-
fic. It is clear that these distinct peaks are a direct response to
the trigger phrase. In 20 trials with different phrases, SNOOP-
DOG was able to detect causality 100% of the time.
6.4.3 Device ID via MAC Address Lookup
SNOOPDOG checks its database for a match of OUI in the
device’s MAC address. If present, SNOOPDOG can inform
the user with higher confidence that the device is indeed a
surveillance device. Otherwise, it is added to the database and
identified as a clandestine sensor.
6.5 Device Localization
SNOOPDOG uses dead reckoning and asks the user to walk
around the perimeter of the room to obtain a rough map of
the room. Next, the user is asked to perform a detection trial
at various locations within the room. More trials lead to better
localization. At every location, SNOOPDOG tries to establish
9
a cause-effect relationship with the device traffic. Regions
with no cause-effect relationship are eliminated. This pro-
cess is repeated to further reduce the search space for each
clandestine device.
IP Camera: The traffic generated by a camera monitoring
a scene will increase when the scene is dynamic. To exploit
this, we first monitor the traffic of the device identified as a
camera for 30 seconds over a static scene. Each trial consists
of standing in a particular location (e.g., the middle of the
scene), pointing a laptop in a particular direction, and playing
a video that rapidly changes the colors on the screen of the
laptop for 30 seconds. This process is then repeated in dif-
ferent directions. If the camera is able to monitor the laptop
screen, its data rate during that period will be higher. On the
other hand, if the laptop screen is not visible, the camera’s
traffic rate will be similar to the static scene. We can eliminate
a fraction of the space where no activity is detected and repeat
the process for the remaining region. In this way, we narrow
down the possible region where a camera is located. We give
a step by step walk-through of this process in section 7.
RF sensor: RF sensor localization is similar to that of a cam-
era. However, since RF sensors cannot detect the flickering
screen of the laptop, we use human movement. SNOOPDOG
asks the user to stand in the middle of the space and wave their
arm up and down rapidly in front of them while shielding this
motion from the other side of the space with their back. If
the RF device traffic does not respond to these stimuli when
performed on one side but responds to it on the other side, we
can eliminate that space.
Motion Sensor: Motion sensors are triggered by motion in
front of them. SNOOPDOG first identifies the motion detector
timeout (refer section 6.4.2), and then asks the user to stand
in the middle of the room before the timeout expires. After
timeout expiry, they are asked to move their hand in front of
them while shielding it from the other side with their body.
Acoustic (Audio) sensors: SNOOPDOG records the wake
word of the device and asks the user to move around the
room while this sound is repeatedly played from the smart-
phone app. If the user walks around the room but does not find
any place where there the traffic of the device changes, we
increase the volume and repeat the experiment. On the other
hand, if the sound played at every point in the room causes
the traffic of the device to vary, we decrease the volume and
repeat the experiment. Finally, we identify areas where the
sound causes network response and areas where it does not.
We continue to reduce the volume of the device until the
search space has been sufficiently reduced5.
7 Evaluation
For evaluating SNOOPDOG , we used 4 cameras, 1 motion
sensor, 1 Amazon Echo and 1 RF sensor. We selected off-the-
5A walk-through of this process is provided in section A of the Appendix.
Camera Trials Successful Accuracy
Foscam 15 15 100%
Wansview 30 29 96.6%
Kamtron 25 21 84%
Victure 26 26 100%
Total 96 91 94.7%
Table 1: Evaluation results for camera detection
shelf IP cameras at different price points to evaluate if we can
achieve similar performance despite device heterogeneity.
7.1 Wireless sensors that encode raw data
Wireless IP Cameras. For Granger causality analysis, we lag
the first series by one element at a time and observe what value
of the lag results in the lowest p-value. Cameras have a delay
between when the scene changes and when the data is visible
to the adversary. We found that this delay can vary between a
few milliseconds to up to 4 seconds. If the adversary is using a
tape delay in transmission, we can perform this analysis over
a longer delay period. In this time, the camera captures the
video, encodes it, and sends it to its cloud server, which then
forwards it to the receiving display. Assuming symmetrical
delay, SNOOPDOG sniffs the packets during the first half of
the transmission; we choose a lag value of 2 seconds.
The p-value threshold below which SNOOPDOG claims a
successful detection is set at 0.08. We selected this using the
results obtained from the first camera. However, we evaluate
our detection with all the other cameras and show that this
p-value threshold is optimal for all the cameras.
We evaluated our detection for 4 cameras – Foscam
($49.99), Kamtron ($39.99), Victure ($35.99), and Wansview
($29.99). We performed 80 trials on 2 different users6 to eval-
uate the detection accuracy. The results of our experiments are
presented in table 1. To improve the detection accuracy and
confidence of detection, a user can perform the detection trial
several times and take a majority vote. The detection works
well even when a portion of the human body is occluded by
objects such as a table.
RF sensors. We use a TI mmWave IWR1443BOOST to eval-
uate the performance of SNOOPDOG for detecting RF sensors.
We first monitored the traffic with no motion in the space and
then asked the subject to move in and perform the detection
trial. If the traffic of a device rapidly changes during move-
ment but becomes stable if there is no activity, we conclude
there is a cause-effect relationship between user motion and
the device. In 20 experiments, SNOOPDOG was able to detect
RF sensor presence every time.
7.2 Wireless sensors encoding inferred events
For sensors that encode inferred events, it is not possible to
perform pure time-series Granger causality analysis to ascer-
6The data is collected from the authors and hence does not require IRB
approval.
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tain if there is a cause-effect relationship present between
the sensor because their network traffic is discrete. Instead,
we perform an activity and track network response. To de-
tect the presence of an event-based sensor, we ask the user to
move around the room, wait for the timeout period, and move
around again. SNOOPDOG scans all device traffic within a pe-
riod of 5 seconds after the motion to determine which device
responds to user motion. If the device has traffic activity after
the user moved, then the device is inferring events from the
user motion. We evaluated this with an off-the-shelf motion
sensor from Kangaroo Security. We performed 15 trials, and
SNOOPDOG was able to detect this device every time.
7.3 Localization
We evaluated SNOOPDOG for 4 different spaces with differ-
ent sensor placements. The accuracy of localization in all of
these cases depends on the user’s requirements. The user can
perform more trials to reduce the probable region where the
sensor is placed. We use an example to demonstrate how the
SNOOPDOG localization algorithm works. To perform our
localization, we chose a room as shown in Figure 8. The cam-
era is placed at a corner of the room. We begin by performing
our S5 detection trials in different parts of the room. The
location and results of our trials are shown. Based on these
observations, we know that the camera is present somewhere
in the square region of the room and hence, we eliminate the
other part and start our trial-based localization.
- Causality not found
- Causality found
3.04 m
3.04 m
1.3 m
2 m
Figure 8: Lab dimensions and results of the detection trials.
We stand in the middle of the probable space and hold a
laptop such that the screen is pointing in one direction. Then
we turn to the other side and repeat the same experiment. We
observe that there is a significant (>150%) increase in the
camera data rate when the laptop is pointed towards the left
side. When pointed to the right, the data rate remains similar
to that of an empty room. Thus we eliminate the right portion
of the room from the probable area. We again stand in the
middle of the leftover space and repeat the experiments until
we achieve a sufficiently reduced space.
Audio-based localization: A similar elimination-based local-
ization for audio sensors is described in Appendix A.
7.4 Overhead Analysis
Time: Sensor detection can happen in the background with
minimal user intervention. However, this will take some time.
In situations where a user wants to immediately know if he/she
Figure 9: A walk-through of the trial-based localization algo-
rithm in the laboratory environment in Figure 8. The arrows
represent the direction the laptop screen was facing.
is being spied on by a sensor (such as when entering into a
changing room), they can skip the first phase and directly
begin the second phase where they will perform the S5 mo-
tion. It takes about 40 seconds to perform active detection.
For localization, each trial can take 30 seconds. Since the
localization space reduction is determined by the user, he/she
can perform the trial any number of times. If the total number
of trials is n, the overhead will be about 30n seconds.
User effort: If the detection occurs in the background, there
is no overhead in terms of user involvement. However, both
active and localization phases require user effort. In case the
user is suffering from physical disabilities, he/she may find it
hard to follow through these steps.
7.5 Effects of range on detection
The range of a device plays an important role in its detection.
The camera range is the depth which it can record meaningful
information from the scene. If the user stands too far from the
camera, the S5 trial may not produce enough variation in the
camera traffic for the cause-effect relationship. For motion
sensors and RF sensors, the range is specified by the vendor.
The motion sensor that we used has a range of 15 feet (4.6 m)
and the RF sensor we used had a range of 4 m. For Amazon
Echo, the range is a function of the loudness of sound. For the
camera, we perform our detection trials at different distances
to find out what the range of detection is.
We perform the S5 motion in front of a camera at 1 m and
gradually increase the distance. We find that as we move away
from the camera, the changes in its traffic decrease. For the
Wansview camera, the distance at which traffic changes are
not enough to establish causality is the smallest at about 3 m.
7.6 False negatives for background detection
Figure 10 shows camera traffic and IMU data for a user walk-
ing randomly in a room. As long as the user stops at some
point within the detection period, SNOOPDOG is able to de-
tect hidden devices. However, if the user is continuously sta-
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tionary or continuously in motion, SNOOPDOG fails to detect
the presence of clandestine sensors.
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Figure 10: Wi-Fi traffic of a camera and its comparison with
IMU data of a user walking randomly with stops
8 Discussion
Q1: What is the usability of SNOOPDOG? We envision
SNOOPDOG to be implemented as an app on either a smart-
phone or a smartwatch (or a combination of the two). This
means an end-user will not need any prior knowledge about
causality and coverage of a device to use it. SNOOPDOG will
continuously work in the background to look for a cause-
effect relationship between a user’s actions and device traffic.
It will then guide a user step-by-step through the entire lo-
calization procedure. Since an adversary can place a sensor
at any time (e.g.,when a user checks in a room, searches for
devices, finds none and then leaves for dinner after which the
adversary places the spying device.), SNOOPDOG will still
find it because it continuously works in the background. This
will not cause any overhead in terms of user involvement.
Q2: Can SNOOPDOG detect any wireless sensor? Although
SNOOPDOG can detect a wide variety of sensors, it cannot
detect any wireless monitoring sensor. For a sensor to be
detectable by SNOOPDOG, the traffic must be encoded with
a Variable Bit Rate (VBR) algorithm and the data recorded
by the sensor must change in response to user perturbation
which can be recorded by a ground truth sensor. That said,
most surveillance devices such as cameras, motion sensors
and smart-home assistants today fall into this category, and
thus we believe SNOOPDOG can serve as a valid defense.
Q3: How can false positives be reduced? For false positive
to occur during active detection, the device’s traffic needs to
map directly to the S5 motion during the active phase and
user’s motion during the background phase, which is unlikely.
If there happens to be another camera in an adjacent space
monitoring another user who is performing the detection trial
within the same time window as the first user, it will trig-
ger a false detection. However, this probability is extremely
low. We were unable to identify false positives over our net-
work evaluation. Nevertheless, it remains a possibility, and
mitigating such instances are highly desirable.
Simple strategies can significantly reduce the chances of
false positives. First, during the initial monitoring phase for
wireless devices, any periodic trends in traffic patterns can
be noted; the detector trial should ensure its periods are not
synchronous with such periodicity. Furthermore, the detection
process can be done multiple times with varying and erratic
period lengths. This will drastically decrease the chances of
a false positive, as a device would have to coincidentally fol-
low this effectively random traffic pattern. Finally, the entire
process itself can be performed repeatedly; each iteration
compounds the decrease in false positive rate, such that it
eventually reduces to a statistical impossibility.
Q4: How can devices fool SNOOPDOG? If the adversary
suspects that the subject is using SNOOPDOG, they can either
modify the encoding schemes, turn off the device, use data
padding, add random noise, or vary the resolution of the data
being transmitted. We detail these approaches in Appendix B.
However, if the traffic of THE device changes drastically
when the detection trial is performed, this in itself is a form
of causation and SNOOPDOG can detect it.
Q5: Are there alternative approaches to causality?One alter-
native approach to detecting snooping sensors is correlation.
Correlation measures the size and direction of the relationship
between two variables. If the values of two variables change
at the same time and in the same direction, they are highly
correlated. However, correlation does not imply causation.
If we have a sensor that measures the ground truth in the
modality we want to detect, we need to use causality analysis.
For example, it takes the camera some time to process the
information and send it over to the server. So if we capture hu-
man motion with an IMU, the camera traffic will lag the IMU
time series. This is correctly captured by causality analysis
but not by correlation. However, if instead of using a sensor
to measure the ground truth, we use another sensor that can
capture the same modality that we are trying to detect, we can
use correlation because if both the devices are capturing the
same event, their traffic should show similar trends.
Future work can also explore the efficacy of data-driven
approaches such as deep learning for time series classification.
Q6: Can SNOOPDOG work for other wireless communi-
cation standards like Bluetooth, Zigbee, and Z-Wave? Al-
though SNOOPDOG targets Wi-Fi-connected devices, we can
generalize the same framework for other popular wireless
communication standards. This framework can be extended
to standards like Zigbee [39], Z-Wave [40], and Bluetooth
[16, 41] as long as we have the following: 1) A receiver that
can scan their probable frequencies and sniff their packets to
find if any devices are transmitting and 2) the ability to find
unique device IDs from packet headers and distinguishing
header information from payload size.
Q7: What happens when there are multiple people present?
When there are multiple people present in the space, we need
to ask everyone to leave during detection and localization.
In cases where other users are non-cooperative, their motion
12
will affect the network traffic of these devices and cause false
alarms or false negatives.
Q8: Can we detect continuously streaming audio bugs?
There are two ways to encode audio, either constant bit rate
(CBR) or variable bit rate (VBR). VBR techniques make use
of similarity in sound, such as prolonged silence, to reduce
the amount of data required for encoding. In contrast, CBR
always encodes with the same number of bits. Many off-the-
shelf audio recorders and audio streaming apps use CBR.
Since SNOOPDOG only has access to the payload size of a
packet, there must be variation in the payload to determine
causality. Hence, SNOOPDOG cannot detect CBR audio bugs.
9 Related Work
This section presents the most relevant and related works.
Detecting hidden devices using RF signals. A popular tool
to detect hidden devices is called a bug detector [42], which
is an RF receiver that can sense if the received power in a
particular frequency range is above a threshold. The problem
with such devices is that they are not reliable, and can pro-
duce false alarms when used near other sources of RF signals
such as mobile phones or laptops [14, 15]. Also, they give no
additional information about the type of device and where it
is located. After detection, the onus lies completely on the
user to physically find the device and verify if it is a hidden
surveillance device or not. The host may have a wireless de-
vice to monitor the power consumption of his property, but to
the bug detector, it would seem similar to an IP camera.
Classifying devices on the network using wireless traffic
sniffing. While services like Princeton IoT Inspector [8] col-
lect traffic statistics to identify the types of devices present on
the network, they fail to identify if those devices are indeed
spying on the user or not. Just ascertaining the presence of a
surveillance device is not enough. The device may be present
outside the house or it may be monitoring some part of the
house which was already disclosed by the home owner. In
cases like this, just identifying such a device exists is not
enough, we also need to determine two important facets – is
the device spying on the user and is it located in an area of the
house that has the potential to violate user privacy. Moreover,
tools like this need to have access to the network in order to
be effective. If the snooping devices are placed in a hidden
network or on a password protected network, the use cases of
such a tool are limited.
Other network traffic analysis tools [43, 44] utilize traffic
data to find which devices are consuming high bandwidth.
Such techniques can be used to classify audio and video data
streams present in the wireless networks. However, with an
increase in streaming services [45, 46], it is difficult to distin-
guish camera video and audio flows with those of streaming
services based on just their bandwidth usage.
Detecting cameras on the network using wireless traffic
sniffing. In [9], Wampler et. al. shows that information leak-
age occurs in camera traffic due to how videos are encoded.
They observe that changing lighting conditions cause notice-
able variations in the network traffic. Several works [10, 11]
leverage this observation to detect cameras monitoring an
environment. Though these techniques perform well, their
performance degrades when the environment lighting changes
naturally. Additionally, while this technique works well for a
camera, it does not generalize to other types of snooping de-
vices, like RF sensors or motion detectors. Finally, in order to
be able to change the lighting conditions of a space, the user
requires either specialized hardware (like an LED board or a
bulb) or access to lighting controls, which is not guaranteed.
Data driven approaches like DewiCam [13] extract features
from the intrinsic camera traffic patterns to train a classifier
which can detect cameras. They exploit the correlation be-
tween human motion and camera data flows to determine if
the camera is indoors or outdoors. However, it is unclear if
such an approach will hold true over diverse set of cameras
with varying processing speeds and data flows.
In [12], Wu et. al. present another technique to detect hid-
den streaming cameras through simultaneous observation.
The authors use their own camera to record a scene while
simultaneously sniffing the network traffic. They compare the
data rate and pattern of their trusted camera with other de-
vices in the network to look for any similarities. If a similarity
exists, there is a high probability that the device is a camera.
Localizing wireless devices using RSSI. Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI) is the estimate of the power re-
ceived at the receiver from the transmitter. As the distance
between the transmitter and the receiver increases, the power
received drops, and so does the RSSI. This property is lever-
aged to localize devices using RSSI [47–50]. However, due
to phenomenon like multipath and shadowing, the accuracy
of RSSI based localization varies from space to space [51].
As a result, the error is very high (in order of several meters).
For small rooms, such a result will be meaningless, as the
snooping device can be effectively hidden anywhere.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented SNOOPDOG , a framework to de-
tect, identify, and localize any wireless sensor monitoring a
person in an arbitrary space. SNOOPDOG works by establish-
ing causality between a set of ground truth sensors monitoring
a user and the transmitted information of wireless devices on
a WiFi network. It then uses this causality to perform trial-
based localization. We implement SNOOPDOG on a set of
commonly available devices such as a smartphone and a lap-
top and evaluate our solution on a set of representative clan-
destine sensors. The framework had a detection rate of 96.6%
and a device classification rate of 100% when the injected
multi-modal event was human motion or sound.
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Appendix A Audio-based Localization for
Personal Home Assistants
In this section, we describe the audio localization technique
step-by-step. First, we find the optimal volume at which when
the sound (a phrase containing the wake word of the device)
is placed on some points causes the device traffic to change.
Then we go around the room while SNOOPDOG repeats that
sound continuously and checks them for causality with device
traffic as shown in Figure 11. Sound played at the points
marked as green produces cause-effect relationship with the
device traffic. We eliminate the region where we detect no
causality. Next, we reduce the volume by 1 level and repeat
our experiment in the left-over space till we are left with a
region of desirable size.
- Causality not found
- Causality found
3.04 m
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4
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Figure 11: Trial-based localization for acoustic sensors.
Appendix B Techniques to fool SNOOPDOG
B.0.1 No Encoding or Data Padding
SNOOPDOG uses the relationship between encoding schemes
and ground truth to find out if there is a device which is
monitoring the user. Hence, to fool SNOOPDOG , the sensors
can either send un-encoded raw data or they can pad the
encoded data to make the data rate constant. Cameras can
either pad their traffic or they can send un-encoded images
frames. Since sending images will put a large overhead on the
network bandwidth, padding the traffic [30] is a better idea.
We pad the camera traffic wind random payload in Figure 12.
Since SNOOPDOG cannot see what’s inside the payload, it can
be anything. The device can even send labels in the payload
that help the server decide if this is a valid packet or fake data
generated to fool detection. Also in Figure 12, we pad the
traffic of a motion sensor to make it appear like a constantly
transmitting device with no variation in traffic in response to
user’s motion.
For RF sensors, one can find out the maximum number
of points it can output and then always pad the information
so that we are transmitting the maximum number of points
allowed. These extra points could all be zeros which would
make it easier to filter them out on the server side.
Since motion sensors only send information if certain
events occur, they can pad their traffic when no event oc-
curs. As a result, they will have constant traffic for which
causality analysis is not possible.
B.0.2 Adding Random Noise to the Data
Another way to fool SNOOPDOG is by injecting noise into the
device’s wireless traffic at random intervals for some time win-
dow. Since SNOOPDOG utilizes the change in device traffic
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Figure 12: Padding the motion sensor and the camera traffic
to ascertain a cause-effect relationship, the variations caused
by injecting random noise are able to fool the detection.
Devices that do not transmit continuously can randomly
send information that creates a pattern similar to their inferred
event traffic. This way they can keep sending their information
which is hidden within random traffic. We add random noise
which appears like regular traffic for a motion sensor in Figure
13. This noise can be anything, and hence the server can
differentiate it from actual motion events.
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Figure 13: Injecting noise in the traffic of a motion sensor to
fool SNOOPDOG
B.0.3 Constantly Vary the Resolution of the Data Being
Transmitted
For devices like camera, there are several video resolutions
that an adversary can choose. The higher the resolution, the
better the video quality is. However, if an adversary chooses
a scheme where the video resolution is constantly varying,
it will cause random changes in the network traffic. Hence,
even if the user’s motion is causing changes to the traffic, it
is overpowered by the changes in network traffic due to a
variation in resolution.
For RF sensors, they can vary the number of maximum
points that they transmit continuously to achieve a similar
effect.
B.0.4 Adding a tape/broadcast delay to the transmis-
sions
An adversary can add a tape delay to the sensor transmissions,
i.e. intentionally adding a delay between when something
was recorded and when it was transmitted. Since, we are
only looking for causality within a small time window, a
high tape delay will be able to fool SNOOPDOG . However,
given enough storage capacity and time, it is possible for
SNOOPDOG to scan the entire recording to look for cause-
effect relationship with user motion. But for large tape delays,
this is not practical.
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